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Abstract Since 2011 the intersection between media and civil society organisations (CSOs), 
both of which have bloomed in Tunisia, has become a powerful source of support for the 
development of citizen-run (or associative), community-based radios.  In identifying three 
critical areas in which civic media and NGOs are translating social programmes to strengthen 
concepts of citizenship through cooperative action -  information provision, advocacy and 
education - this study argues that they are contributing to the development of a strong new media 
space in the form of citizen radios. These, often web-based broadcasters, provide opportunities, 
particularly for youth in both provincial and urban areas, to develop capacities as producers, 
consumers and story subjects, offering them new tools to experiment with blogging, citizen 
journalism, social messaging and identity building. The partnership of these two sectors provides 
significant benefits in terms of funding provision, democracy promotion and capacity building, 
although, it is argued, they can also place limits on the independence and future growth of these 
citizen radio platforms. The message, financing, and regulation of this growing field of civil 
society/ citizen radio output remains at the centre of a continuous negotiation of powers shifting 
to the public sphere. 
 
 
The new political, civic and social environment that the 2011 revolution brought to Tunisia 
opened spaces for ideas to be expressed and circulated with less governmental censorship than 
previously. Media and civil society are two sectors that faced oppression and centralised control 
for decades. Since 2011, they have experienced significant development, which has allowed 
them to build partnerships and share tools particularly with popular outlets such as community 
radios, and practices such as citizen journalism and blogging. The exchange of these tools and 
ideas between media and civil society organizations is reinforced with shared capacity building 
programs where media corporations and CSOs merge efforts to highlight and strengthen 
concepts of citizenship.  
Both sectors are experiencing phenomenal growth and diversification, changes they share as a 
result of the new environment in which they are operating. Not unexpectedly, both are seeking   
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shared platforms of cooperation and are rapidly establishing opportunities for possible 
partnership. 
 
 A new environment for free expression: Rock, paper, scissors 
The children’s game ‘Rock, paper, scissors’ provides a useful metaphor for the intersection 
between media and civil society engagement  vis-a-vis the government, prior to January 2011.  
During the Ben-Ali years, little pleasure could come with playing this game. The rules were set, 
and so were the results. If a journalist used paper, or by extension, a microphone or a camera, to 
express his or her views, it was inevitable that the content and possibly the mode of that 
expression would face the “censorship scissors”. The same applied to those in civil society 
organizations. Practitioners in both sectors were constrained from expressing opposing or 
unconventional political views. Amin (2002) shows that the long practice of censorship on 
Tunisian media led to self-censorship becoming common place
1
. If a media outlet or a Non-
Governmental Organisation (NGO) or even an individual journalist had too frequently to be 
censored, the risk was a “rocky” response from the Ministry of Interior. The responses could 
vary from seizure of the tools, to imprisonment of the “paper” player.  
The creation of NGOs depended on issuing authorisation from the Ministry of Interior, which 
had set juridical limitations preventing the development of civil society in Tunisia. The criteria 
for authorising NGO creation was based on the political stance of these NGOs and whether they 
were complicit with the regime. The authorisation process was applied in discriminative and 
vague ways, giving the authorities “discretionary powers to issue or reject a visa”2. Reports on 
civil society in Tunisia show that authorised civil society was unable to address ‘political’ issues, 
and dependent on their level of adhesion to the politics and national strategies of Ben Ali
3
. 
International organisations were banned from operating in the country and sustainable funding 
for local ones was contingent upon their instrumentality for supporting the regime’s propaganda.  
The new environment created by the revolution to pursue freedom of opinion and expression is 
permitting both media and NGOs to operate more independently and creatively, making the 
results of the game appropriately unpredictable in a dynamic environment where freedom of 
expression is now negotiated. For NGOs, this has meant shifting control of their institutions 
away from the hands of the Ministry of Interior, which used to issue NGO licencing, and 
working under a new law published in September 2011, which protects their independence and 
freedom of membership and operations
4
. For traditional media (TV, radio and press), the 
possibilities that this new environment offered permitted the expansion of ownership more 
robustly into the private sector after the dissolution of the Communication Ministry in 2011. 
 
 The growth of media and NGOs since 2011 
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Three major changes affected the civil society – media nexus in the immediate post-revolution 
period. First, the laws affecting them were liberalized, leading second, to a spurt in their overall 
numbers, and third, a resultant reconceptualisation of their role and purpose in society.  
The 2007 UNICEF report on Civil Society in Tunisia showcases how those civil society 
organisations authorised to operate during the Ben Ali period were mainly partisan, at a time 
when legislative authorisation, as well as financial and administrative support, were dependent 
upon complicity with the regime
5
. This dependence was severed upon the passage in September 
2011 of the 2011-88 law, regulating the environment for CSOs in Tunisia. The new law gives 
more freedom to NGOs, opens space for non-Tunisian ones and removed limitations on their 
functions. 
With the privatisation of media and the independence of NGOs, the number of both has boomed 
since 2011. IFEDA, the Centre for information, training, studies and documentation on NGOs in 
Tunisia indicates the number of NGOs in Tunisia reached 17,000 in May 2014, a rise from 9,000 
before the revolution
6
. The growth is indicative not just in the number of media outlets and 
NGOs, but importantly, by the enhanced sense of ownership and independence that they have 
gained. Reports suggest that we can speak of an advent of a new era of CSO dynamics in 
Tunisia
7
. For media, this resulted in a diverse set of outlets ranging from new TV channels, 
radios including community radios, newspapers, magazines and online journalism. 
With the booming of NGOs and blooming of media, more coalitions and networks have been 
emerging, convening practitioners and empowering their representative voices. Coalitions and 
networks are forming based on shared approaches to similar issues and interests such as human 
rights networks or entrepreneurship coalitions. NGOs are organizing into networks such as the 
National Network for Anti-Corruption
8
 and Lam Echaml
9
, the latter grouping over 50 
organisations that share a space for information, training, tools and best practices on Human 
Rights, Civic Education and Citizenship. Media institutions have been organizing themselves 
into syndicates, such as the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists. Moreover, Le Syndicat 
des Radios Libres, a syndicate for free radios, was created representing new private and 
community radios and advocating for their rights. Although some of these syndicates were 
established before the revolution, their role in unifying practitioners and advocating for freedom 
of expression became more significant after it, allowing practitioners to lobby for better 
legislations and support to their institutions
10
. 
 
 The new raison d'être 
The third common change in these sectors relates to the role they started to fill. In response to the 
liberated environment and the growth they experienced, media and CSOs have begun playing a 
new role within society: Before the revolution, both sectors were used as propaganda tools for 
Ben Ali’s regime while also engaging youth in apolitical issues and topics such as sport. Media’s 
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“only mission was to provide the government and Ben Ali himself with a powerful and directly 
managed tool to disseminate messages and content which would allow a more reasonable control 
over the formation of public opinion” (Barata 2013, 121)11. For the majority of NGOs, this was 
observed in the strategies and programmes they employed to promote the regime’s own 
strategies and vision. National youth organisations, for instance, were mainly grouped under the 
Tunisian Union of Youth Organisations, a union that was strongly tied to the Constitutional 
Democratic Rally (Ben-Ali’s RCD party) carrying communication and political campaigns in 
schools and universities through organisations such as the Organisation of Students of the 
Constitutional Democratic Rally. 
Following the uprising in 2011, CSOs and media started to serve three new functions: 
Information provision, Advocacy and Education: 
Information provision: Access to information has been facilitated by the decrease in censorship. 
Additionally, media and civil society organisations are attempting to represent multiple views 
and to be less partial when transmitting information. A politicization of both sectors can be 
observed as they are equally affected by a heavily polarized political scene
12
. The expansion of 
media and CSO institutions (in space, functions and resources), albeit pluralistic in their 
domains, remain influenced by the polarized political debate in the country, as some 
organisations receive funding from political parties
13
. Al-Abdouli, an official of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has declared that some charity organisations, supporting religious parties, have 
received foreign funding to support Islamist groups
14
. Although their creation, development and 
opportunities are today less conditioned by the need to spread any particular line of propaganda, 
civil society organizations and media have been taking political stances and projecting a “certain 
polarisation of visions and models that are relatively contrasted”15, referring to the agendas of 
secular and religious political parties. Patel and Belghith (2013) suggest that “Civil society in 
Tunisia is embroiled in the struggle for political power now raging in the transitional period, and 
civil society organisations have often appeared forced to choose between either French laïcité-
inspired secularism or Ennahda-loyal Islamism” 16 .The polarisation of the sector is mainly 
observed through the example of organisations that officially support political parties and 
promote their agendas, such as the now-banned League for the Protection of the Revolution, 
which at times appeared to be an Ennahda affiliate. The private TV channels have also expressed 
strong political stances, particularly at intense times of political division, such as elections, or 
during moments of crisis, such as in early 2013, when opposition figures, Chokhri Belaid, and 
Mohamed Brahmi, were assassinated. 
In spite of this, a diversity of expressed opinions and an emphasis on information rather than 
misinformation is developing. Research suggests that “the most popular resources of information 
are television programs, the internet (…) [and] youth organizations formed after the revolution 
that provide young Tunisians with as much information as possible about all of the newly-
formed Tunisian political parties”17 (Zarlenga 2011, 12). 
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Advocacy: A rising interest in advocating rights and monitoring the performance of political 
actors has led to the development of watchdog organisations focused on fighting corruption, and 
establishing accountability and transparency, such as Bawsala, and the Open Data Initiative. 
Media practitioners and institutions also are engaged in revealing cases of corruption and 
advocating for good governance. The case of Sheratongate, which erupted on 26 December 
2012, and revealed by Olfa Riahi, a journalist and bogger, marked an early milestone in 
investigative journalism in Tunisia that advocated transparency and accountability
18
. The 
journalist posted bank and state documents on her blog that exposed the Ennahda-appointed 
Minister of Foreign Affairs using government funds to conduct elicit parties at the Sheraton 
Hotel, going on to reveal further details of the case during interviews on Ettounsia, a private TV 
channel. The case revealed details of financial corruption and sexual scandal, made all the more 
notorious as the Minister of Foreign Affairs was also a relative of Rachid Ghannouchi, 
Ennahdha’s party leader. Although it took two years, the Sheratongate Affair brought the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs to court on charges of misusing public funds
19
 and provided a 
leading example of the significant counter-force that CSOs and media have become as actors in 
the political transition
20
. 
Education: Before 2011, schools were used as platforms for political education and enhancing 
citizenship. However, the classes avoided discussing political reforms, free elections or 
legitimate representation. Zarlenga (2011) shows that these classes had little impact on the 
students and did not engage them in political issues or debates
21
. Since 2011, media and civil 
society organisations have become key actors in developing political awareness. During the 2011 
elections, both sectors made efforts to educate young people and raise awareness about political 
participation. Bus Citoyen, a project by six NGOs focussed on active citizenship, political 
education and democracy, launched a tour in all the country’s governorates where volunteers met 
citizens in different venues (e.g. cafes, markets, schools) to sensitize them to the importance of 
their participation in the elections. This project inspired Barcamp, a “non-conference” based on 
the principles of public participation and public exchange of knowledge, which was led by a 
private magazine, Tunivisions, where media practitioners toured the country to discuss the young 
generation’s vision of their future and transmitted these opinions through the magazine to the 
general public. Other organisations such as IWatch, gathered young people to educate them on 
issues of transparency and corruption while training them to monitor elections on a national and 
local level (e.g. elections of student representatives in universities). 
 
 Merging efforts: Media and CSO partnerships 
For the purpose of this study, among the most important changes in Tunisia after the revolution 
has been the new tendency of CSOs and media to create partnerships and merge their efforts. 
This is not only caused by the intersection between the two sectors in terms of the themes and 
issues they deal with. In a small society such as Tunisia, it is also related to the tendency of 
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activists to be media practitioners and vice versa. This particularly is the case with bloggers who 
are often active advocates in NGOs while being reporters and online journalists at the same 
time. These partnerships make the lines between media and NGOs less definable as media 
platforms can become a space for lobbying, advocacy and raising awareness while NGOs can 
become a space for disseminating information. This is illustrated in the example of al-Nawaat, 
established in 2004 by activist Sami Ben Gharbia, a blogger and advocate for freedom of 
expression and human rights
22
. A widely visited collective blog in Tunisia, al-Nawaat has taken 
it upon itself to monitor the democratic transition in the country while also focusing on “training 
activists on Internet technology and citizen journalism, assisting NGOs and independent 
activists carrying forth similar missions, monitoring elections, and continuing to publish rich 
and diversified content on human rights, and economic, environmental and social issues”23.  
Capacity building programmes have become the most common area where media and NGOs 
meet and collaborate. The exchange of tools and ideas between media and civil society 
organizations is reinforced with shared capacity building programmes where media corporations 
and CSOs cooperate to reinforce citizenship. This is predominantly observable in community 
radios as well as NGO journalism training programmes that draw upon media expertise. 
Partnerships are emerging in the production of programmes highlighting active citizenship, such 
as “Associatif”, a radio programme on Express FM. At the same time, several NGOs are 
developing a media component in their structured programmes that are involving journalists and 
media experts. The Inkyfada project, a new Tunisian web magazine, for example, brings together 
journalists monitoring and analysing terrorist attacks in Tunisia
24
. The project itself is part of Al 
Khatt NGO, an organisation that focuses on the production of journalistic content and developing 
good journalistic practices
25
. 
 
Community radios in Tunisia before and after the revolution 
Community radios refer to radios that are “grassroots or locally oriented (…), dedicated to the 
principles of free expression and participatory democracy, and committed to enhancing 
community relations and promoting community solidarity” (Howley 2005, 2)26. Manyozo (2012) 
proposes three approaches that can be drawn upon to analyse this phenomenon, seeing it as a 
characterization community development, a vector of media’s role in development, and a 
necessary tool for participatory communication
27
. 
The three approaches, which convene concepts of communication, development and 
participation, offer a conceptual framework that can explain the growth of community radio in 
light of technology, function and process. The development of media focuses on the use of the 
new technology in terms that are mutually reinforcing, in that the new freedom and 
independence that enables citizen-inspired media to take shape is at the same time enhanced by 
the capacity of the media sector. Arnold (2010) suggests that: 
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“Media development starts from the assumption that the media have an important role in 
the state as they hold those in power accountable and provide citizens with information 
that they need to actively participate in the political sphere. Only an independent and free 
media system can achieve this. Therefore, media development targets the capacity of 
journalists and other media actors to fulfil their democratic function, the sustainability of 
independent media, and the legal environment that guarantees media freedom and 
independence. So it’s about capacity, sustainability, and legislation. Media development 
takes a systemic perspective, treating media as a sector”28.  
The second approach focuses on media as a process and a tool to communicate information 
about development projects such as health and education programmes that rely on the media to 
raise public awareness and change behaviours. In this approach, media is the instrument that 
development agendas use to inform and educate people and to attain projected development 
outcomes. Deane (2008) describes media for development as the media that “serves a set of 
social objectives which development organizations share”29.  
The third approach centres on media as a process that facilitates community participation and 
redefines media as a participatory exercise. Manyozo advances the notion of participation as “a 
fundamental component of both development and communication for development, which 
allows for the articulation and incorporation of multiple voices and interests in the design, 
implementation and evaluation of development policy”30 (Manyozo 2012, 9). 
In the light of these three approaches, the growth of community radio can be seen as not only a 
sign of the progress of media independence and freedom but as a means to solidify transitional 
democracy. Community radios can also be conceived of as carriers of a development discourse 
to raise awareness and educate the population. Furthermore, they are at the heart of community 
participation as they focus on community members as the producers, the recipients and the 
message of the radio’s content. In Tunisia, community radios are a relatively new phenomenon. 
Few initiatives to build community radios in Tunisia were started before 2011. Just two 
initiatives, Radio 6 (established in 2007)
31
 and Kalima (founded in 2008)
32
 made efforts to 
develop their community radios and discuss themes of citizenship and human rights on the 
internet. The two radios were initiated by media leaders and political activists such as Salah Al 
Fourati and Sihem Ben Sidrine and were hosted on the web in the absence of legislative, 
administrative and financial support.  However, they faced harassment and censorship of their 
web pages, which were rendered inaccessible inside the country during the ruling of Ben Ali
33
. 
 In 2005, Tunisian media activists from several NGOs (such as Club UNESCO Bardo) 
participated in a region-wide training programme held in Egypt and organized by the “Naseej” 
Foundation, a regional foundation that develops resources for community youth development in 
Arab countries
34
. The training provided a space for Tunisian participants to meet with journalists 
from radio “Horriyetna” and radio “Al-Balad”, two popular community radios located in Egypt. 
The training was followed by an internship in 2007 at Horriyetna to learn from the experience of 
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this radio in operating under dictatorship. However, it was only after the 2011 uprising that 
community radios developed in Tunisia itself as a space for citizen expression and debate on 
society’s problems and as a platform to discuss themes of citizenship and human rights that 
could in particular engage the youth and enable their voices to be heard.  
Community radios in Tunisia are hosted on the web and use social media to promote their 
programmes. They often recruit young volunteers, who are interested in journalism, to ensure  
low-cost production and presentation of their programmes in the absence of profitable business 
plans. They are usually launched as NGO projects in which they are employed to help amplify 
their work on freedom of expression and youth capacity building. For this reason, many citizen 
radios depend on funders who allocate funds to NGO programmes that tailor to their 
development priorities. These are usually international agencies operating bilaterally (foreign 
embassies and cultural centres) and multilaterally (United Nations Development Programme, 
European Union). Many of these organizations provide partnership and development funds to 
associated NGOs so they can help establish community radios in donor-targeted states. The 
funds are provided to support the donors’ vision of open societies, local democracies and 
freedom of expression. In some instances, the funding achieves the intended goals, in others, the 
approach functions as a means of soft-power export into the target country, and as a mechanism 
of cultural imposition that has little bearing on the community needs or identities of the locales in 
which their funding is directed.   
The reach of community radios in Tunisia remains minimal compared to commercial radios 
whose audio signal is carried by an AM or FM radio wave. Only a handful of community radios 
in Tunisia have reached as many as 200,000 listeners. One example is Ana Tounsi Radio, which 
operates online, producing programmes from its studio and facilities in  downtown Tunis
35
. The 
large audience is partly explained by the capacity of the radio – located in the Bardo area where 
the Constitutional Assembly meets - to invite members of the parliament to discuss issues of 
importance with radio interviewers.  
The size of community radio audiences is usually measured by online visits. The audience passes 
through a quick sign up procedure before beginning to listen, which enables the radio to monitor 
its visitors at different times of the day and the week.  Most of these radios operate at specific 
hours in the afternoon and evening, usually from 6pm to 12am when volunteers, mostly young 
people, are available. The actual (often still small) audience numbers for many community radios 
is not in itself the critical factor, as the radios are not commercial projects; rather, it is the 
involvement of community members in the production of news and other programmes that is of 
most significance. Elyes Ezzine, the director of Ana Tounsi Radio, said “most of these 
volunteers are usually students, pupils, entrepreneurs and unemployed graduates.” He added that 
“the change we see in volunteers who become engaged in issues that concern them and develop 
their skills throughout their career at the community radio is more important, at the moment, than 
the low number of audience we attract when compared to the audience commercial radios 
have”36. 
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As an outcome of the partnerships between media and CSOs during political transition, 
community radio programming tends to cover themes that concern citizens, particularly those 
living within their areas. The radio programmes include political debates with their local 
Constitutional Assembly representatives, the promotion of economic and social rights, talk 
shows on topics related to citizenship, community, and the larger society (e.g. programmes on 
the lives of women in the community and its challenges), coverage of the traditions of the 
community through interviews with elders, and news on new projects being undertaken in the 
area. Other programmes involve talent shows for citizens and coverage of cultural events in the 
area as well as religious programmes that may broadcast Friday sermons from one of the 
mosques in the neighbourhood. 
 
 Community radios as a powerful tool for connecting youth to their communities 
Despite being a relatively new phenomenon in Tunisia, community radios have been pushing 
legislative boundaries on media entrepreneurship and CSO projects, while serving pedagogical, 
political and societal functions within their areas of reach. Many of these radio channels were 
established as “associative radios”, registering themselves as a project of an NGO rather than as 
an independent radio. The majority of these radios chose to tie themselves to NGOs and benefit 
from the administrative recognition and fundraising efforts they could offer. This describes, for 
example, Radio 3R created by the Regueb Freedom and Development organisation and Radio 
Ana Tounsi created by Club UNESCO Bardo. As an NGO project, community radios can raise 
funds from development agencies and from bilateral and multilateral donors  that have set 
development outcomes, such as media capacity building for a target population. In the absence of 
a judiciary framework for community radios, these channels were able to operate as part of NGO 
programmes; however, at times, the connection has limited their reach and development. 
After 2011, several applications for radio licensing led to an estimated 38 new radios being 
established on the internet by 2012, including 12 radios in youth centres
37
. Youth centres are 
governmental institutions managed by the Ministry of Youth that used to provide arenas for 
cultural and sport activities in many of the country’s neighbourhoods. The centres were 
perceived as propaganda tools for Ben Ali’s regime as they often hosted events promoting his 
leadership. Their role shifted after 2011 as they struggled to define a new identity and to generate 
a different reputation in order to attract young residents. Cooperation with local groups and 
NGOs permitted them to acquire a new role by reconnecting them to their communities and 
shaping them as community centres that could offer space for free debate, entrepreneurial 
projects and youth initiatives. 
The interaction and cooperation between NGOs and community radios initiatives was enhanced 
by the creation of a regional task force and fund, the Aswatona Fund for Media Development
38
, 
and monitored by other initiatives such as the Media Sustainability Index (MSI) produced by 
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IREX which analyses the situation of independent media in the country
39
. Organisations such as 
World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (WACRB) organised workshops bringing 
together journalists and civil society actors to plan media initiatives. These platforms facilitated 
collective efforts for lobbying and advocacy for the development of community media in 
different parts of the country, along with funders, NGOs and media institutions such as the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and UNESCO. The World Association for Community Radio 
Broadcasters, for example, supported the creation of the “Voice of Mines” radio, a project of the 
“Voice of Others” NGO in Gafsa where the local labour movement and public demonstrations 
have pushed for social reform since 2008. Lobbying for better legislation concerning community 
radios led to the creation of a special status for “associative radios” in the statutes produced by 
the new media regulatory body, HAICA, in May 2014
40
. Twelve community radios received 
permission to go on air after the revolution as associative radios, five of which moved to FM  
radio waves -  Kelma, Radio 6, Radio Karama, Radio Revolution Rgueb and Radio Chambi -  
while the others remain web-based due to financial constraints. Moving to FM radio 
broadcasting is expensive and requires investment, strong managerial and staff capacities as well 
as sustainability plans. This has proved to be a difficult process, and is challenging community 
radio development, long-term sustainability and the radios’ identity as non-profit initiatives. The 
transition can also be difficult in terms of audience acceptance. After its high-cost move to FM 
broadcasting in 2013, for example, Radio Kelma faced criticism, strikes and bankruptcy as it see-
sawed between its status as a ‘revolutionary’ community radio and its new position as a private 
radio seeking investments and advertisements to sustain its work.  
 
Challenges to community radios 
Despite the promising developments characterising the new crop of community radios, 
interviews with journalists and directors of community radios reveal a number of concerns and 
challenges that these spaces face at both the strategic and operational level. The close juridical 
and financial ties between community radios and NGOs can prevent the former from firmly 
establishing themselves as independent media initiatives outside the ambit of their partnering 
NGO. Their funding is usually limited to a timeframe that depends primarily on the donors’ 
funding commitments, which in turn depend on the donors’ short term (two year) and mid-term 
(five year) policies, objectives and resources. These constraints keep the radio projects dependent 
upon, and defined by, the NGOs programmes, which can prevent them from taking the next 
essential step of establishing themselves as independent initiatives.   
In spite of the creation of their new regulatory status, the dilemma surrounding the legal, 
managerial and financial status of community or ‘associative’ radios in Tunisia marks the 
relations they have with different stakeholders. The danger of other social players misperceiving 
or mishandling community radios is real, and constitutes the negative side of the intersection 
between community service organizations and small citizen media endeavours. Professional 
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journalists and traditional media can be prone to discount community radios as little more than 
recreational activities for needy youth, or as tools for NGOs  to promote their agendas. NGOs, 
for their part, often reduce community radios to mere ‘development tools’ that allow them to 
attain the development outcomes they must report to funders. The risk is that these 
misperceptions can contribute to community radios being turned into propaganda tools to be 
used solely for the purposes of praising the work of the partnering NGO and the youth centres in 
which they operate. What is more, the financial reliance of community radios presents a high risk 
to their sustainability not only as they remain dependent upon the budget, but likewise the 
priorities of international funders.  
This risk is particularly present in cases where young journalists feel they are being patronised 
and controlled by community radios directors, which detracts from their interest and motivation 
to develop into radio professionals. Managers or activists within NGO programmes can likewise 
prove over-bearing to young journalists by imposing their own development priorities. Other 
decision makers in community radios such as editors, who are frequently professional or 
accredited journalists brought on to train volunteers, can mismanage young staff by flaunting 
their professional experience and qualifications. As noted by a young journalist at Ibn Khaldoun 
radio, “the structure and work environment are still patriarchal, with the main editor or the 
director of the radio making their own decisions and obliging young volunteers to abide by them, 
which eventually affects the motivation and enthusiasm of the youth journalists”. These 
problems are exacerbated by the low budgets available, and the volunteer status of the radio 
staff, although in post-revolution Tunisia, where media contracts and employment terms remain 
unresolved, these are difficulties that concern not only citizen radio offices, but most media 
offices across the sector. 
However, despite the pitfalls of the asymmetric partnership formula between NGOs and 
community inspired radios, and despite the difficulties faced by youth volunteers and training 
staffs, the majority of citizen radios have found a voice specific to their audience and their 
community, cementing their own longevity by serving a community that otherwise would lack 
the sense of political engagement, or the alternative viewpoint, that citizen radios offer. 
 
 The role of community radios in Tunisia 
Besides reinforcing partnerships between the significant players (media and CSOs) throughout 
the political transition that started in 2011, community radios play an important role in building 
the capacities of marginalized youth, promoting democracy in large urban neighbourhoods and 
enhancing the sense of belonging and ownership of a community’s residents. Among the most 
important new roles that community radios play are their capacity to act as pedagogical tools, as 
mechanisms for building democracy awareness, and as the means for developing social 
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narratives and new national identities. They therefore can act as a pedagogical, democratic and 
social tool for building grassroots habits of citizenship. 
As pedagogical tool: Community radios tend to share similar objectives to NGOs when it comes 
to building capacities in the target population. Previous studies have showcased this: The 
Declaration on Christian Education at the Second Vatican Council in 1965 stated how radio 
communities in Latin America, while working with community groups and organisations, 
supported student education by developing their cultural, political and social knowledge, helping 
them to become “actively involved in various community organizations, open to discourse with 
others and willing to do their best to promote the common good”41.  
The  programmes developed through NGO-media partnerships are aimed at empowering youth 
by involving them in the start-up, establishment and operations phases, while also including 
them in planning for sustainability by engaging them in discussions around fundraising and 
marketing. Some existing community radios, such Radio Ana Tounsi, are already equipped with 
training centres for young journalists and members of NGOs that are interested in building their 
skills in editing news, moderating debates, conducting interviews and learning press ethics. Joint 
training programmes are conducted by media corporations such as l’Académie Radio France 
International
42
, while mentorship is offered by other community radios. In targeting marginalised 
youth in Tunisia, community radios aim to provide a space for their voices while building their 
media and entrepreneurial skills through practical application. Young journalists involved in 
these radios develop their own ethics chart and decide on the editorial line and the programmes 
to be included in the radio schedule. They become the leaders of this space where they can 
propose media projects, discuss topics that concern them the most and express themselves with 
enhanced communication skills. In an interview with the radio journalist Oussama Ferchichi, he 
confirmed that the youth volunteers he worked with have collectively decided on the editorial 
line of Ibn Khaldoun Radio after receiving training in journalistic ethics
43
. 
As a democratic tool: In a transitional period where power is constantly negotiated, community 
radios play a major role in promoting local democracy. They permit youth to discuss the 
problems of the community with city council representatives after identifying the main issues 
through interviews with community members. Young journalists can discuss security and 
infrastructure challenges in their areas with local decision makers and after the interviews, 
continue to monitor the efforts underway through NGO accountability mechanisms. Young 
activists are thereby able to use interviews with decision makers to remind them – as well as the 
radio’s audience - of their promises, and indeed, profile them at advocacy and policy-making 
meetings. Interviewing 145 members of the Constitutional Assembly, Ana Tounsi Radio, for 
example, provided space for exchanges between young journalists and political leaders where the 
youth could question the decisions being made and express their aspirations to their political 
representatives.  
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By being community-led and focused, these radios encourage young journalists to create a bridge 
between the radio audience and the civil society organisations that want to reach them. Reporters 
from the radio will for example, conduct opinion polls with youth audiences to pinpoint their 
needs and desires, then report on common themes requested by a region’s youth-to-youth centres 
and  finally, provide youth centre directors with information to help tailor their activities to meet 
these needs. Saber Draouil, the director of Radio Sidi Hssine, emphasized that “these opinion 
polls and reports played a significant role in directing Sidi Hssine youth centre programmes to 
cover themes and issues that the target population requests and to organize events such as 
concerts and workshops around these themes”44. According to Manyozo’s media development 
framework, this participatory and community communication process reflects 
“community-based engagement approaches through which development stakeholders 
employ participatory communication in order to author development from below. The 
approach builds on participatory action research strategies from which community 
communication emerges to facilitate the implication of indigenous knowledge systems in 
deliberative development dialogue (…).The objective is to initiate  ‘cyclical’ approach of 
looking, thinking (reflecting) and acting in ways that engage development stakeholders in 
collective planning and decision making in order to influence local development and 
social change
45” (Manyozo 2012, 18). 
The decentralisation of the decision-making and the promotion of freedom of expression and 
citizenship are at the heart of any democratizing process. Some of these radios, albeit being at the 
inception phase, start to give power to the people of the community by enabling them to identify 
their concerns and discuss them with local politicians, community leaders and other decision-
makers. “In our radio talk programme called ‘Zoom A’ala Sidi Hssine’”, explained Draouil, ‘we 
discuss the problems and concerns we have about our neighbourhood with local politicians and 
city council officials and we challenge them to provide solutions for issues such as pollution and 
infrastructure in Sidi Hssine”. 
As social tool for citizenship, ownership and identity: In addition to their role in building 
capacities and promoting local democracy, community radios aim to serve a social function by 
connecting youth to their area and bridging the gap that often divides them from other 
demographic groups residing in their neighbourhoods (whether generational, gendered or 
socioeconomic). Most of Tunisia’s urban areas are densely populated neighbourhoods where 
young people are marginalised. Community radios can enhance the sense of responsibility and 
belonging of these groups, particularly those that are the most vulnerable (youth, women and 
disabled community members). In his interview, Oussema Ferchichi, a journalist volunteer at  
Radio Ibn Khaldoun, said that “working for the radio as a reporter spread [his] social networks in 
the neighbourhood and allowed [him] to connect to the poorest, the most vulnerable and most 
marginalised residents in Ibn Khaldoun”, the neighbourhood in which he interviews them and 
reports on their opinions
46
.  
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In contrast to radios that focus on serving urban slums, community radios play a different role in 
certain provincial cities for which development agendas and funding are less prioritised and 
where marginalisation is felt across rural and urban areas. An example is Kerouan, a town in the 
middle of the country that is eclipsed by the economic and job opportunities that Sousse, its 
thriving  coastal sister city, largely monopolizes and which, additionally, has only one privately 
owned radio station (Sabra FM – itself quite new) and the closest National Radio office is 
likewise on the coast at Monastir. The young directors/founders of the citizen station Radio 
Kerouan, have been very focussed, therefore, on using the radio to promote a sense of 
importance for the city and give it a local identity.  Their efforts include highlighting social and 
infrastructure issues in their region, shedding light on the city’s historical patrimony and 
developing a political consciousness “that really thinks of Kerouan”, as explained by Mohamed 
Remmeh. “It is really important to work on our region…and to develop the life here. If we don't 
make change here, we won't change the region, and we won't change the nation”47. 
An IREX study conducted soon after the revolution that involved training workshops for young, 
regionally based aspiring and practicing radio journalists in the provinces recommended 
community radios be encouraged, as there was a need to  focus on rural and marginalised cities 
in the north and south of the country. Community radios in Gafsa, Kasserine and Regueb, where 
the revolution started and yet where its development fruits have so far to be reaped, are playing a 
crucial role in allowing young people to express themselves away from stigmatising and 
victimizing discourses. Radio 3R (Regueb, Revolution, Renouveau)
48
 in Regueb and Radio 
Houna Elgassrine
49
 in Kasserine aim to contribute to the social role valorisation of youth in these 
regions. Along with the purposes of education, democracy and citizenship that these radios share 
with others in slum zones in the capital, community radios in these rural and urban provincial 
areas tend to focus on the importance of their communities, emphasising the constructive role 
that the youth can play and providing coverage of specific economic and social problems that 
they face
50
. 
 
 Conclusion 
In the past three years, the growth and development of civil society and media have been 
intertwined in Tunisia. The intersection between the sectors is particularly salient in the function 
and role they have recently started to play as media and civil society platforms and tools that can 
now be owned and managed by citizens who report their own stories. The audience, the 
producers and the reporters have moved to the public sphere were media and civil society 
organizations are monitoring, assessing and contributing to the political transition in the country. 
Communities and people, rather than a political icon such as Bourguiba or Ben Ali, now fill the 
headlines of newspaper stories, the TV and radio shows and the social media content. They are 
the stories, and their lives the message, that media corporations and civil society organizations 
are trying to voice.  
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Community radios are playing a significant role in empowering youth as journalists, and are 
engaging them in the political debate at a time when youth are still struggling to overcome the 
image of being an “invisible generation”, a phrase coined by former education minister Hatem 
Ben Salem. As they enhance their communication and leadership skills while developing their 
awareness of local issues, young people involved in community radios tend to connect to civil 
society organisations, and to cascade ideas and practices of active citizenship and freedom of 
expression in their communities. Despite often being managed by older decision-makers 
conditioned by the Ben-Ali years of censorship and patriarchal structures,  community radios 
continue to create new dynamics vis-à-vis their audiences. While facing juridical concerns, 
financial dependence on NGOs funders and sustainability challenges, community radios likewise 
continue to constitute a valuable asset that can reinforce freedom of expression, youth leadership 
and local democracy. Their importance is further evident in areas where youth voices are 
marginalised and receive less attention from traditional media institutions. 
When interviewing young activists, entrepreneurs and artists from 2011 to 2012 in a study 
tracking youth perceptions of the political, social and economic changes in Tunisia since the 
revolution, I came across strong condemnation of mainstream platforms as excluding youth 
voices
51
. Young people expressed their frustration with mainstream media as being affiliated to 
political parties and incapable of providing transparent and neutral news, or representing and 
empowering those who made the revolution. At the same time, they expressed hope, as they 
found civil society organisations to be an alternative “third sector” that is less affected by the 
dichotomies faced in mainstream politics and media. The developing number of youth 
organizations and young volunteers in CSOs promises to engage young people to be active actors 
in the county’s transition, rather than passive witnesses. Supporting community radio 
development can therefore create a space for young people to reimagine, recreate and reproduce 
media content that meets their expectations and represents them and their national hopes. These 
platforms can satisfy some of young people’s ambitions of self-representation, community 
leadership and local democracy. As one of the interviewees put it, “There are a lot of people who 
want to change things. My ambition is big but the question is: do I have the means to realize it or 
not?” Community radio provides the promise to be one of a potential means. 
 
As the development of radios and the role of youth are both being negotiated, community radios 
appear to be succeeding in promoting their communities and engaging their members in the 
democratic process. A key feature of the transition is the continuous negotiation to create spaces 
for marginalised people, particularly the youth. These contested spaces are a manifestation of a 
longer revolutionary process, where people are learning to gain power institutionally after having 
exerted it first in Tunisia’s streets. 
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